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CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-MISTAKE OF
FACT IN DEFENSE OF OTHERS
Gerald Young, defendant, while making a delivery, observed two men
struggling with a youth. The defendant ran immediately to the scene of
the struggle to aid the youth whom he assumed was being unlawfully
beaten. He attacked the men, causing one to fall and break his leg. Un-
known to defendant, the two men were detectives lawfully arresting the
youth; he made no inquiry to find out. The defendant was convicted of
third degree assault. The conviction was reversed by the Appellate Divi-
sion of the Supreme Court of New York. The Court of Appeals reversed
the Appellate Division and upheld the conviction, holding that one who
intervenes in a struggle between strangers, under a mistaken but reasonable
belief that he is protecting another who he assumes is being unlawfully
beaten, is criminally liable. People v. Young, 11 N.Y.2d 274, 183 N.E.2d
319, 229 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962).
In this case of first impression in New York, the Court adopted the rule
that one who comes to the aid of a third person does so at his own risk.
The states are almost evenly divided on this question, and the courts
weigh the factor of public policy and the requirement of mens rea in
arriving at their decisions.
The courts which do not allow the defense argue that a state may elimi-
nate the requirement of mens rea in these cases if the public welfare bene-
fits. In United States v. Balint' the United States Supreme Court, in
affirming the conviction of a defendant who unknowingly sold narcotics
in violation of the law, held that the emphasis of the law is upon achieve-
ment of some social betterment rather than the punishment of the crime.
Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Johnson,2 said that the
principle of police regulation is "the greatest good to the greatest num-
ber. ' '3 This is the reasoning adopted in the Young case.
Most statutes which impose strict liability on the actor and make the
commission of the criminal act alone a crime are based upon the power of
the state to regulate for the public good.4 In Commonwealth v. Weiss,5
1258 U.S. 250 (1921).
2 288 Ill. 442, 123 N.E. 543 (1919). 3 Id. at 446, 123 N.E. at 545.
4 Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933). Offenses not requiring
mens rea fall roughly within the following groups:
(1) Illegal sales of intoxicating liquors
(2) Sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs
(3) Sales of misbranded articles
(4) Violations of anti-narcotic acts
(5) Criminal nuisances
(6) Violations of traffic regulations
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
where defendant violated the state law by unknowingly selling oleomar-
garine as butter, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said it is for the legisla-
ture to determine whether the public injury threatened is so great as to
justify an absolute and indiscriminate prohibition.
The state's actions to protect the public are based upon the seriousness
of the crime, e.g., anti-narcotic laws, selling adulterated foods, etc., or upon
the evils that may arise if the act and the defense are allowed. A New
Jersey court pointed out one such evil in State v. Chiarello,6 where it was
said that if the intervener should happen on the scene when the innocent
victim of the assault had the upper hand, the innocent participant might
be harmed by the actor who would reasonably believe he was the aggres-
sor. Allowing the defense would cause the innocent victim to be harmed
if appearances were against him. Another argument put forth is that law
enforcement might be hampered by overzealous citizens, ignorant of the
facts, who go to the aid of persons being arrested.7 This is what occurred
in the Young case.
Furthermore, it is argued that allowing the defense would enable the
intervener to have greater rights than the one he defends, and this would
be against the public policy as it enables the intervener to do what the
defended person could not do.8 In the Young case, for example, it would
have allowed Young to strike the policemen when the youth he was de-
fending could not have. As was said in the California case of People v.
Will,9 the intervener stands in the shoes of the defended person and has
exactly the same privileges or lack of privileges as he does. This court felt
that the right of a person to defend another ordinarily should not be
greater than such person's right to defend himself.
This position is countered by those jurisdictions which hold that allow-
ing the defense would benefit the society by enabling bystanders to aid
those in distress-an act which will usually avoid a more serious injury
and aid in the capture of the assailant. If bystanders can help, innocent
(7) Violations of motor-vehicle laws
(8) Violations of general. police regulations, passed for the safety, health, or well-
being of the community
(9) Sex offenses committed against girls under the statutory age
(10) Adultery and bigamy
5 139 Pa. St. 247, 21 Atl. 10 (1891).
669 N.J. Super. 479, 174 A. 2d 506 (1961).
7 See argument of the dissent in the Appellate Division holding of the Young case, 210
N.Y.S. 2d 358, 12 App. Div. 2d 262 (1961).
8 Robinson v. City of Decatur, 32 Ala. App. 654, 29 So. 2d 429 (1947); Commonwealth
v. Hounchell, 280 Ky. 217, 132 S.W. 2d 921 (1939).
9 79 Cal. App. 101, 248 Pac. 1078 (1926).
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men will not be killed for lack of defenders. It can be seen that a law,
passed to prevent intervention by prohibiting the mistake of fact defense,
would be violated if someone dear to the actor was being beaten and the
intervener came to his rescue.10 It does not seem just that one should be
convicted of a crime if he selflessly attempts to protect the victim of an
apparently unjustified assault."
Some courts argue that the right of an individual to act from appear-
ances, when he has a reasonable belief as to the danger, outweighs the
interest of society to convict such a person of assault or worse.12 As
Bishop, a well-known criminal writer, says:
What is absolute truth no man ordinarily knows. All act from what appears,
not from what is. If persons were to delay their steps until made sure, beyond
every possibility of mistake, that they were right, earthly affairs would cease
to move .... All, therefore, must, and constantly do, perform what else they
would not, through mistake of facts. .... 13
The second factor used by courts in determining this problem is the
necessity of the mens rea requirement for a criminal conviction. Those
jurisdictions not allowing the defense follow the rationale laid down by
the majority in the Young case, that is, it is sufficient for conviction if
the defendant knowingly struck the blow. The defendant intended to
commit the act of assault and this intent is all that is required for convic-
tion.14 This view is also supported on the basis of the police power of the
state: it is reasoned that if the state deems that the act is against public
policy, it is within the state's power to eliminate the need for any mens rea
to obtain a conviction.15
In the Young case, a strong dissent presents a contrary argument, name-
ly, that criminal intent requires awareness of actual wrongdoing. It is
argued that basic to the imposition of criminal liability, both at common
law and under our statutory law, is the existence in the one who com-
mitted the prohibited act of what has been variously termed a guilty mind,
a mens rea, or a criminal intent. Therefore, if the intervener's act would
be innocent provided the facts were what he believed them to be, he does
10 2 BURDICK, LAW OF CRIME 136-37 (1946).
11 See State v. Chiarello, 69 N.J. Super. 479, 174 A. 2d 506 (1961).
12 Reeves v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 32, 217 S.W. 2d 19 (1949); Brannin v. State, 221
Ind. 123, 46 N.E. 2d 599 (1943); Little v. State, 61 Tex. Crim. 197, 135 S.W. 119 (1911).
13 1 BisHop, CRIMINAL LAW 204 (9th ed. 1923).
14 See also Pacheco v. People, 96 Colo. 401, 43 P. 2d 165 (1935); Lvitt, Extent and
Function of the Doctrine of "Mens Rea," 17 ILL. L. REv. 578 (1923).
"5 State v. Lindberg, 125 Wash. 51, 215 Pac. 41 (1923); State v. Quinn, 131 La. 490,
59 So. 913 (1912).
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not have the criminal mind, and, therefore, cannot be convicted of the
crime. Courts have repeatedly held that a person should not be convicted
of a common law crime if he had no criminal intent.16
Illinois has adopted a stand, contrary to that of New York in the Young
case, in its Criminal Code which provides that:
A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent
that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself
or another .... 17
A reasonable belief then, notwithstanding the fact that it is later proved
to be wrong, will justify the use of force. Illinois case law also allows the
defense of reasonable mistake of fact. In People v. Dugas's defendant was
convicted of assaulting one Obert who appeared to be viciously beating
Mullins, defendant's friend. The Illinois Supreme Court, in reversing the
conviction, held that the right to take life in defense against a felonious
attack extends to the defense of others, whether relatives or strangers.
Furthermore, it was a question of fact for the jury if defendant was rea-
sonable in his belief that Obert was assaulting Mullins. This case also
allows a reasonable belief, even if wrong, to serve as a defense. This is
exactly the same contention as the dissenters argue in the Young case
where it is said that the mistaken belief must be one which is reasonably
entertained, and the question of reasonableness is for the trier of the
facts.19
In conclusion, the Young case seems to represent a trend toward the
gradual elimination of the mistake of fact doctrine in cases of defense of
others where the intervenor could be convicted of serious crimes. How-
ever, the defense is accepted in homicide cases, e.g., one can kill another
whom he reasonably believes is about to commit a forcible felony, or he
can kill to protect his habitation, etc., and he will not be convicted of
murder.20 If the defense is available for these acts, it seems logical also to
allow it for lesser crimes. The rule adopted in the Young case is a step in
the direction of convictions for serious offenses without any regard for the
actor's motive or intent, a step which must be viewed as extremely
questionable.
16 State v. Chiarello, 69 N.J. Super. 479, 174 A. 2d 506 (1961); Williams v. State, 70
Ga. App. 10, 27 S.E. 2d 109 (1943); State v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. of America, 111
W.Va. 148, 161 S.E. 5 (1931); State v. Mounkes, 88 Kan. 193, 127 Pac. 637 (1912).
17 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 (1961).
18310 111. 291, 141 N.E. 769 (1923).
19 See also State v. Chiarello, 69 N.J. Super. 479, 174 A. 2d 506 (1961).
2 0 Thomas v. State, 255 Ala. 632, 53 So. 2d 340 (1951); People v. Eastman, 405 Ill. 491,
91 N.E. 2d 387 (1950); Viliborghi v. State, 45 Ariz. 275, 43 P. 2d 210 (1935); State v.
Hennessy, 29 Nev. 320,90 Pac. 221 (1907).
